Michigan Law Review
Volume 82

Issue 4

1984

Legal Education: Its Causes and Cure
Marc Feldman
Rutgers University School of Law, Camden

Jay M. Feinman
Rutgers University School of Law, Camden

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Society Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Marc Feldman & Jay M. Feinman, Legal Education: Its Causes and Cure, 82 MICH. L. REV. 914 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/36

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS CAUSE AND CUREt
Marc Feldman*
Jay M. Feinman**
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s. By Robert Stevens. Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press (Studies in Legal History). 1983. Pp. xvi, 334.
$19.95.
Until recently, lawyers and legal scholars 1 neglected the history
of American law and its interaction with other forms of social process.2 That neglect is being corrected. But the surge of interest in
American legal history generally is only beginning to produce a similar interest in the history of legal education.3 Now, Robert Stevens,
proceeding with perspective gained by withdrawing from direct participation in the law school process,4 has written the first comprehensive account of the development of legal education in ~erica.
Among other goals, the new legal history attempts to reconstruct

t See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 10 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Tushnet,
Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981).
Parts II and III of this review are condensed from a manuscript entitled "Pedagogy and
Politics" that we are now preparing. The manuscript presents a conceptual approach to law,
lawyering and learning and discusses as a case study our course in Contorts (Contracts, Torts,
and Legal Research and Writing).
·
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A. 1970,
Washington Unive~sity; LL.M. 1981, Harvard University. - Ed.
** Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A. 1972,
American University; J.D. 1975, University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. The differentiation of academic law and legal practice makes the differentiated form of
reference almost irresistible, although the two groups do overlap. See pp. 38-39.
2. The definitive historiography is Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common
Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SocY. REV. 9 (1975).
3. Notable exceptions are Stevens' earlier work and the research of Anthony Chase on the
origins of modem legal education. Stevens, Two Cheersfar 1870: The American Law School, 5
PERSP. AM. HisT. 405 (1971); Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 329 (1979). See also First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 311 (1978). Other important contributions include relevant portions of Jerold Auerbach's
book on the legal profession and John Henry Schlegel's research on legal realism, J.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 74-87, 88-94, 108-11, 166-67, 275-77 (1976); Schlegel.American
Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
459 (1979); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case
of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1981).
A genre of the history of legal education more notorious than notable is the institutional
history of an individual law school. See Konefsky & Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
Histories ofAmerican Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REv. 833 (1982).
4. Formerly on the faculty of Yale Law School, Stevens is now president of Haverford
College.
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the way lawyers and judges in different periods thought about legal
doctrine, legal institutions, and their own place in society; that is,
their attempts to situate themselves, their actions, and their beliefs in
a coherent social vision. 5 Stevens' Law School chronicles the development of beliefs about law, lawyering, and learning held by the bar
and the professoriate and the legacy of those beliefs in shaping the
law schools of today. His account provides the material for a
description of the social vision of those engaged in legal education,
although Stevens does not himself describe that vision. Indeed, because the book uses traditional approaches to traditional themes in
thinking about legal education, it is itself an example of that vision.
In Part I of this review we discuss the book, its considerable
strengths, and its limits. In Part II we explicate and criticize the
premises of modem legal education - the vision of law, lawyering,
and learning upon which it is based. In Part III we offer a brief statement of a countervision that describes both lost historical opportunities and imaginative possibilities for the improvement of legal
education.
l.

LEGAL EDUCATION

The greatest strength of Law School is its comprehensiveness.
This is as encyclopedic an account of the topic as could be contained
within a single 300-page volume. Stevens begins by describing the
apprenticeship system in colonial America (p. 3) and concludes by
considering the effects of the jurisprudential movements of the
1970's on curricular and pedagogical reform (p. 275). In between, he
relates the early preeminence of the Columbia Law School (p. 23),
the formation of the American Bar Association (p. 92) and the Association of American Law Schools (p. 96), the founding of the Johns
Hopkins Institute (pp. 139-40), and Princeton's recurrent interest in
establishing a law school (pp. 73, 197,236) (with a suggestion that on
this subject Princeton may have been "mesmerized by the view of its
most illustrious president," Woodrow Wilson (p. 250 n.31)). There
are accounts of the claim that law was science (pp. 52-56), of legal
realism (pp. 155-63), Columbia's functional curriculum project (pp.
137-38), 1960's student activism (p. 234), and 1970's anti-intellectualism (p. 269). We also read of emerging patterns of professional selfregulation (pp. 94-95), compulsory bar examinations and schoolbased training (p. 174), the increasing economic attractiveness of
state law schools (pp. 197-98), and the "disheartening" development
of curricula in the post-1945 era (pp. 210-11).
5. See generally Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this issue); Kennedy, Toward an
Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 3 REsEARCH L. & Soc. 3 (1980).
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281 (D.
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Some of the characters and events in Stevens' account are familiar - Langdell's deanship (pp. 35-36), Ames' appointment as the
first full-time law teacher with little practice experience (p. 38), Alfred Z. Reed of the Carnegie Foundation (pp. 112-16), and the
enigma of Roscoe Pound (pp. 136-37) - but Stevens also describes
the contributions of less well known but no less important figures:
Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia (pp. 22-24), Gleason Archer of
Suffolk Law School (pp. 80, 175-76), Edward T. Lee of John Marshall Law School (p. 130 n.62), and John Bradway of the University
of Southern California and Duke Law Schools (p. 162).
Stevens provides a spectacular array of statistics on the legal profession and the law schools in different periods, such as the percentage of bar applicants with college degrees (p. 45 n.18), faculty
salaries (pp. 71 n.89, 88 n.44), law school enrollment figures (pp. 75,
90 n.84), and the bar examination pass rate of correspondence school
graduates (p. 221 n.33). We learn, among other things, of the increasing urbanization of law school populations in the early twentieth century (p. 76), tuition costs of private versus state schools (p.
197), the proportion of women in the law school population during
World War II (p. 199) (and that Harvard did not admit women at all
until 1950 (p. 203 n.63)), and-the effect of the G.I. Bill in swelling law
school ranks after the war (p. 205). The sources for this wealth of
data appear to include all the available published materials on legal
education, including law school histories, commentary, and primary
sources.6
Fortunately, Stevens is not content simply to present a mass of
facts. The book is usefully organized into thematic chapters
.presented chronologically. Thus, a chapter or group of chapters
both advances the story in time and focuses on a particular issue.
The prologue to the main story is presented in the first two chapters,
which discuss the forms of legal education in the colonies and the
early republic, as well as the expansion of the bar, the growth of law
firms, the institutionalization oflegal education, and the initial affiliation of law schools and universitites after the mid-nineteenth century. Stevens suggests that professional decline in the early
nineteenth century should not be explained as "an excess of Jacksonian democracy" but was, rather, part of a longer history of antilawyer sentiment beginning in the colonial period (p. 8). Here Stevens introduces the recurrent theme of democracy versus elitism in
the control of admission to law practice and in the question of "professional standards" (pp. 5-8, 24-26): "[T]he concept of providing
part of legal training through an institution known as the law school
had become associated with the parallel aspect of institutionalization
6. A 26-page bibliography supports the extensive footnotes, which for some chapters exceed the text in length.
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- the urge to raise standards and so make the bar more competent
and more exclusive" (p. 24, footnote omitted).
The central educational theme of Stevens' account is the
Harvardization of legal education. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the
partnership of Eliot, Langdell, and Ames in establishing the style,
structure, and content of modem legal education. The most famous
Harvard innovation is the case method (pp. 52-56), but the trio are
also attributed with responsibility for the professionalization of law
teaching, higher admission requirements, the sequential three-year
program, and a curriculum of "pure law," excluding such topics as
international law, jurisprudence, and legal history (pp. 36-40). Stevens describes the slow but ultimately successful process by which
the case method, and all that attended it, overcame its competitors.
"Theodore Dwight refused to concede that the case method was better 'for any student,' but he was clear it was 'inferior to true teaching
in its effects upon those of average powers'" (p. 57, footnote omitted). "Law decisions are but a labyrinth,'' 'Yrote Dwight. "Woe to
the man who busies himself with them without a clue . . ." (p. 67
n.27). Dwight and his followers felt compelled to resign from the
Columbia faculty in 1891 to protest the introduction of the case
method; eight days later Columbia formally adopted the case
method and a three-year curriculum (p. 45 n.19). Contrary to the
common view, many schools, elite and nonelite, resisted the case
method until well into the twentieth century. Its-eventual triumph
was based as much on the financial attractiveness of the large classes
and high faculty-student ratios it permitted as on its pedagogical effectiveness or intellectual power (pp. 63-64). Nevertheless, by the
1950's, the institutional and curricular patterns established at
Harvard came to dominate the approach of nearly every law school
in America.
A related theme concerns the often-turbulent relations between
the law schools and different segments of the organized bar:
With the development of part-time and evening schools, for the first
time the stratification of the profession was linked to an unacknowledged but obvious hierarchy developing among the law schools. It was
impossible for the ABA to ignore the situation; indeed,_ it had been
formed in 1878 primarily to "improve" the profession. The association
might have opted for institutionalizing diversity, although that \YOuld
have run counter to the egalitarian ethos of the nation. It would have
seemed even more un-American in the last part of the nineteenth century, a period when standardization was a national watchword, not
only in the profession but throughout industry and commerce.
Whatever doubts members had about the case method, almost all were
adamant that a uniform type of law school should control entry to the
profession. [P. 92, citations omitted].

Similarly, with the establishment of the Association of American
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Law Schools in 1900 - an organization of "reputable" law schools
- all member schools were required to meet minimum standards.
These homogenizing requirements dictated student admission
profiles, three-year programs, full-time faculties, and night programs
of greater length than day sessions (pp. 96-97).
But neither the bar nor the academy was unitary. Stevens details
the many conflicts among elite and nonelite bar and elite and nonelite schools. He relates in detail and in admirably evenhanded fashion the complex elements of the story, from the racial (p. 81), sexual
(pp. 82-84), class (pp. 97-100), and religious (pp. 101, 176) prejudice
of the leaders of the bar to the struggles of the defenders of proprietary and evening law schools, such as Lee and Archer, against the
"educational racketeers" - the "deans and professors . . . of 'case
law' schools" (p. 175). This is a story of bitter controversies, shifting
alliances, and uneasy compromises.
The character of this latter theme suggests an important element
of the book's approach. In large measure Law School is political
history, not intellectual or educational history. In Stevens' account,
the story of legal education in America is a story of institutional rivalry and the eventual dominance of the bar elite.7 In the process of
securing their role and, thus, their view of legal education, the fulltime professoriate enlisted the assistance of the bar elite in the form
of the ABA. While the AALS was victorious over the proprietary,
evening, and part-time infidels, it is the elite bar, as accreditors and
employers, that calls the tune. 8
Stevens evidently believes that the history of legal education and
the rivalry between professors and practitioners have been so selfcontained that they can be recounted with only occasional reference
to economic and political events and social movements and almost
no reference to the broader intellectual life of the nation. The Great
Depression put marginal law schools under financial stress (pp. 17778), and activism associated with the Vietnam War placed students
on faculty committees at Yale (p. 235), but by and large in Stevens'
account the law schools are isolated from the currents of their times.
It seems as if events must assume the proportion of world wars, gen7. At first it might seem more accurate to describe the story oflegal education as an uneasy
partnership between the elite bar and elite professoriate. But a look at the life of the law
school and, in particular, contemporary developments in curricula and placement activities
suggest that the organized bar is increasingly imposing its will. This is in part explained by the
recent near-monopolization of law school accreditation and attorney licensure by the ABA.
See note 8 infra and accompanying text.
8. While each association has promulgated standards and accredited law schools, only the
ABA has successfully tied its accreditation process to the licensing of attorneys. Today, graduation from an ABA-approved law school is required as a prerequisite for a bar admission in
some forty states. As to member schools, the AALS seeks to excercise prescriptive authority
only in the form of broad, generally consensual principles. And in the last few years, there has
even been discussion of the AALS "going out of the accrediting business" altogether. P. 245.
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eral economic disaster, or national political scandal before they have
an impact upon legal education.
Similarly, Stevens accurately if unconsciously reflects the intellectual insularity of legal thought and legal education. So far as this
book is concerned, law schools have neither influenced nor been influenced by the intellectual climate of the larger university. In discussing at some length the development of the case method and the
rise to preeminence of the Harvard Law School (pp. 36, 38, 52-55
and accompanying notes), Stevens notes that "[m]uch of the credit
(or responsibility) for this ought to belong not to Langdell . . . but to
Eliot, whose innovations on both the undergraduate and graduate
level of the university had a powerful influence over Langdell" (p.
36, footnote omitted). But what were these innovations? Their origins? How widespread their application? Their fate in other nonlaw settings?
Stevens does not tell us of Eliot's travels to Europe in 1863 to
observe educational systems on the Continent and, in particular,
medical education and its clinical paradigm. We are not told of Eliot's educational reforms carried out at M.I.T. on his return or his
earlier proposals for the Lawrence Scientific School. Eliot's educational theories had been put into practice by 1869 and the structural
similarity of these theories to Langdell's "innovations" (after his appointment as Dean in 1870) is striking. Nor does Stevens describe
the situation at Harvard University more generally when, after 1870,
similar innovations were employed at the medical school, in the undergraduate science programs, and in other departments of the
university. 9
This insularity, this notion of autonomy, appears frequently
throughout the book. As additional examples, one would not know
from Stevens that legal realism was part of a much larger intellectual
tradition influencing not only law but also art, architecture, sociology, anthropology, political science, history and literature. And only
the most perceptive reader would be able to catch the quickly passing reference to bar control of the content of legal education (p. 270)
and to understand contemporary curricular developments in law as
parallel to those in other professions, such as medicine, and as part
of a larger culture of professionalization (p. 238). Professional specialization cannot be meaningfully understood by reference only to
legal actors and sources. In his Prologue, Stevens describes the book
as a "tentative step" in "linking [the history of legal education] to
intellectual, political, and social trends" (p. xiv). In practice, the step
is so tentative as to be indiscernible.
The book is limited in another respect. Although Law School,
9. Chase, The Birth of the Modem Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 334, 336, 343
(1979).
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more than any previous work, considers law schools that are not
among the high and mighty as something other than potential converts or victims, Stevens' work is still to a considerable extent "winners' history." The dominant educational theme is the success of the
Harvard method, and the story of resistance is resistance at Columbia, Yale and Chicago.
Stevens asserts that the "case method showed itself . . . to be a
brilliant teaching device" (p. 57), but is this an evaluation of its educational power or simply an expression of its durability? The case
method is so firmly established that Stevens finds no need to describe
in any detail what it is like in a classroom in which the case method
is employed. For one who has not been to law school, this book is of
little assistance in imagining and understanding daily educational
practice. Stevens is no more helpful in offering a picture of educational practice in nonelite schools. The absence of any meaningful
picture of the classroom mirrors the invisibility of students and
teachers more generally in this book. 10 There are descriptions of individual professors, sometimes quite lengthy, but those profiled are
either "big names" or referred to for their participation in notable
events. Stevens does not even begin the task of constructing an account, for any historical period, of the daily lives of law students or
law teachers.
Equally absent is any sense of the practice of law school graduates - who were their clients, what were their problems, what was
the quality of the work product and the work place? There are occasional provocative references: we learn that the government agencies of the New Deal were attractive to recent graduates and
professors from Harvard and Yale (pp. 137, 141, 160, 168-69 nn. 44
& 45) and we learn from recent bar studies that "the bulk of lawyers
[are] still serving essentially as social workers, or at least business
managers, to the middle-class and established communities" (pp.
267-68). But the references go no further. Stevens does not enable
us to picture, with any texture or depth, learning or lawyering. Admittedly, imaginative reconstruction is one of the historian's most
difficult tasks, but it is also one of the most important.
Even on the institutional level, one can imagine a very different
emphasis in the story of legal education were Suffolk, Marquette,
and John Marshall to figure as prominently as Harvard, Yale, and
Chicago. Dean W.M. Lile of the University of Virginia resisted the
Harvard system; it was not until 1932 when Mason Dobie succeeded
Lile as dean that the case method became generally accepted in
Charlottesville (p. 192). 11 At the University of Montana, there was a
"battle between the president who wanted to appoint Harvard men
10. See Konefsky & Schlegel, supra note 3.
II. See generally w. BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979 (1982).
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to the law school faculty and the State Board of Education who
wanted local practitioners" (p. 191). In 1926, Vanderbilt and the
University of Mississippi were expelled from the AALS because they
would not require two years of college work before admission (p.
195). Wisconsin Law School had been run as an "ideal law office"
prior to adoption of the case method (p. 61). John Pomeroy evidently developed at Hastings a case method quite different from that
of Langdell (pp. 61, 66 n.14), and Richard H. Thornton established
the University of Oregon Law School as a proprietary school but
defied many of the weaknesses typically associated with such an arrangement.12 Stevens notes these many cross-currents in the development of legal education, but fails to provide the detail necessary to
understand and assess them.
Stevens tells us of the persistence and ingenuity of proprietary
schools in responding to the "improving standards" of the ABA and
AALS. "When Illinois demanded graduation from high school
before studying law, the John Marshall Law School established its
own high school for prelaw students. When Colorado decided to
require one year of college, the state's largest . . . law school Westminster University School of Law - responded by opening its
own one-year junior college, available only to potential law students" (pp. 193-94, footnotes omitted). We also know that these
"cut price" schools were economically attractive particularly before
the advent of governmental aid programs, such as the G.I. Bill (p.
205). But can nothing more be said of these "marginal schools"? Is
it really the case, despite their numbers and long history, that they
were without educational and other value? In noting the fate of
three of the four black schools mentioned by Reed in his 1928 study,
Stevens characterizes the stories as "pathetic" (p. 195). Indeed, that
these important sources of training for minority students were being
eliminated was lamentable, but preliminary evidence suggests that
while they were in existence at least some of the teaching was dedicated, demanding, and compassionate. 13 An exploration by Stevens
would have been welcome.
Apprenticeship and clinical education suffer the same neglect.
For much of the history of American legal education, apprenticeship
was the exclusive or favored route for admission to the bar. In 1947,
thirty-four states permitted one to enter the profession via apprenticeship (p. 217 n.9). And as late as 1966, thirteen jurisdictions permitted admission through law office study exclusively, and five more
12. See Lawrence, The University of Oregon School of Law 1884-1903: The Thornton
Years, 59 OR. L. REV. 249 (1980).
13. See W. BRYSON, supra note 11, at 399-402 & 553-56. These passages are brief biographies of Clarence McDonald Maloney and Spottswood William Robinson, Jr., both of whom
taught in the short-lived law department at Virginia Union University.

922

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:914

states permitted a mixture of school and practice (p. 219 n.24). As
originally conceived by Eliot, sound legal education required a
clinical methodology and legal clinics were associated with law
schools beginning about the same time that Langdell's model began
to be widely copied. The University of Denver in 1904 was apparently the first law school to try a clinic as part of its education program.14 John Bradway wrote extensively about the educational
aspects of clinical work beginning in the 1930's (p. 165 n.14) and
established a long-standing program at Duke, as did Charles Miller
with his admirable program at Tennessee, which continues to this
day. By 1968, there was an unexpected and dramatic confluence of
forces: consumerism and citizen activism, elite bar interest, law student activism and demands for relevance, and the funding of the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility by the
Ford Foundation. The result of this confluence was the rise of contemporary clinical legal education. The profound educational and
social concerns embodied by clinical legal education cannot be explored fairly in the space of three pages. Yet, Chapter 12 concludes
with just such an effort (pp. 213-16).
.
"Some worried that an 'educational octopus' [the case method
and Harvard] had achieved far too firm and pervasive a grip on the
system" (p. 41). Rather than take these concerns seriously, by considering the possibility that there was something of value in the holdouts and innovations, Stevens is content merely to catalog the instances of nonconformity. Unfortunately, in the process, he makes
them seem more like short-lived aberrations than serious educational alternatives. Especially for a book the purpose of which is to
enlighten our understanding of the law schools' "function in the social evolution of law, lawyers, and higher education" (p. xiii), the
discussion of alternatives lost or foregone is inadequate.
In short, Law School i~a_well-executed project of limited scope.
Exhaustively researched and documented, as well as highly readable, it may well preempt the field for years to come as the basic institutional history of American legal education. The limits of the work
are really the limits of traditional legal education itself - limits of
breadth, depth, and imagination. Both legal education and Law
School are limited in breadth because they fail to consider the intellectual and political world outside the law schools. They are limited
in depth because they do not provide a meaningful account of what
14. Stoltz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has ii Failed? in
CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 54 n.l (E. Kitch ed. 1970).
Citations describing early efforts are collected in A. REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 220 n.l (1928). Later citations are collected in D. ALSPAUGH, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS ON LEGAL EDUCATION 29-30 (1967).
For a comprehensive history of clinical legal education in the United States, see Grossman,
Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 ]. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974).
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it has been like to teach and learn in law schools over the past one
hundred years. And they are limited in imagination because they are
unable to recapture or conceive of opportunities for teaching and
learning in different ways.
These limits are not unrelated or accidental. Instead, they grow
out of a particular vision oflaw as a discipline and an institution, of
how lawyers practice, and of how students learn to become lawyers.
Stevens' book is both source and illustration for the explication of
that vision. 15
IL

LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS CAUSE

Without a monarch or a clearly defined aristocracy, with a practical
utilitarian outlook, with little by way of competing professions, the
new nation was almost inevitably bound to rely on lawyers to perform
a wide range of functions. Lawyers became the technicians of change
as the country expanded economically and geographically, a development that partly explains why even today lawyers play a more significant role in the United States than in any other developed society. [P.

7].

.

Crucial to the social vision of legal education is a belief in the
necessity of law and the importance of what lawyers do. Stevens'
conclusion of near inevitability is an expression in historical terms of
the prevalent belief that law is indispensable to the economy, polity,
and society. 16 Lawyers are doers, facilitators, advocates, and wise
men. And as law is necessary, so it is imperialistic. The expansion
of curriculum reported by Stevens (pp. 159-60, 168 n.40, 213, 222
IS. After we had completed the manuscript of this review, there appeared in print Robert
Stevens' article, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 442 (1983). The article is an edited text of a presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools held in Cincinnati on January 7,
1983.
In his presentation Stevens offers an approach to legal education that anticipates some of
our criticisms about his book and legal education more generally. He notes, for example, that
"the structure oflegal education . • . was created on the assumption that we have a monolithic
legal profession" and that the law schools have become mere "schools of procedure, rhetoric,
and process." Id. at 443. He criticizes the AALS for having ''been used to control entry to the
profession," as the "handmaiden . • . of the ABA," at the risk of "neglecting the vital issues of
academic scholarship." Id. at 444. Commenting that "[e]ducation in its broader sense has
moved on, and for the most part law schools are not involved in it," he criticizes legal education for having "missed the wider opportunities for legal training," for having "not been seriously involved in skills training outside the analytical skill of 'thinking like a lawyer.' "Id. at
44S.
If it were not for the consistency of wit and style, we might find it hard to believe that the
same Robert Stevens was the author of both the article and the book. We applaud many of the
insights contained in the article, and only wish that they had been employed in the writing of
the book.
I
16. See J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAvt! (1983) (reviewed in this issue). Auerbach
describes a surprisingly rich tradition of resolving disputes and seeking justice without the
involvement oflawyers and courts. This book articulately refutes, at least historically, notions
of the inevitability of law and the indispensability of lawyers.
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n.43, 271) is evidence of the extent to which lawyers consider every
form of social intercourse at least potentially within their purview.
As the nation has become larger, more diverse, and more complex,
lawyers and law schools have viewed themselves as more, not less,
important.
How is it possible that lawyers could play this central role for
such a socially diverse, politically contentious people? Only because
they have claimed to be above the fray throughout history. Much of
the book gives an account of the attempts by legal theorists and practitioners alike to conceive of law as a system of thought and practice
independent of social forces and political infl.uence. 17 The history of
the case method of law teaching is illustrative of this attitude. As
originally conceived by Eliot and implemented by Langdell, the case
method had the virtue of emulating the then-fashionable scientism
and Darwinism. "[L]aw, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines. . . . [T]he number of legal doctrines is
much less than is commonly supposed" (p. 52, footnote omitted).
"Self-contained" and "value free," a set of consistent legal principles
would remedy 'judicial deviations" of the past and cou~d be applied
to each new case (p. 53). Langdell's hope that the method could
reveal the few basic principles of law faded, however, as law's complexity became apparent, but the method was transformed rather
than abandoned. Under the direction of Ames and Keener, 18 the
emphasis shifted to process rather than substance and, as today, the
case method was glorified as the ideal vehicle for teaching students
to "think like a lawyer'' (pp. 55-56). Thus, though law might not
have an obvious objective content, it did offer a formal method for
making decisions.
Even the case method's establishment critics shared the assumption about the autonomy of law. They might attack the case method
on practical grounds, but they agreed on the existence of "settled
principles of law upon which so much of the lawyer's reasoning depends" (p. 59). 19 The great failure of the Realist critics, in the eyes
of many, was their inability to posit an alternative method of analysis which preserved the objective vision of law (p. 156).
17. For a brief discussion of the professional and ideological demands for creating a
"buffer zone" between the claims of politics and those of law, particularly as revealed in legal
historiography, see Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing ofAmerican Legal His•
Jory, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HlsT. 275, 278-83 (1973). Horwitz notes that ''what specially characterizes the profession's conception of modem law - that is, law since the beginning of the
seventeenth century- is the insistence on a radical separation between law and politics." Id
at 281.
18. William Keener's appointment to the Columbia Law faculty in 1890, from Harvard,
and his advocacy of the case method were factors leading to Dwight's resignation in 1891. P.
60.
19. Quoting Report of Commillee on Legal Education, 15 ABA PROCEEDINGS 317, 340-41
(1892).
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There are other examples of the dominance of this notion of autonomous law. In not considering the impact of historical events and
movements, Stevens reflects the general belief that law simply is not
shaped by such external forces. In legal theory, from formal legal
reasoning to late p.ineteenth-century classicism (p. 131) to atomistic
legal reasoning (p. 133) to Lasswell-McDougal policy science (pp.
264-66), law and lawyers are seen as independent of society but useful to it. Throughout, the emphasis is on the process of lawmaking
rather than its substantive effects on and its difference from other
systems of social, political and ethical judgment.
All of this has had a significant impact on the conception of appropriate forms of legal theory and the relation of theory to legal
practice. Legal scholarship has overwhelmingly meant the production of articles engaging in doctrinal problem-solving (pp. 270-71).
Legal scholars focus on extremely narrow topics within well-accepted doctrinal categories; their sources and modes of analysis are
exclusively legal. This is their appropriate activity because of the
divorce of legal theory from either more abstract or more concrete
conceptions. Neither grand theorizing nor the actual workings of the
legal system or lawyers' practice fit within this limited notion of legal
scholarship. The occasional exceptions to this pattern, dalliance
with social science or an empirical version of "law in action," are so
exceptional and usually so unsuccessful as to be noteworthy. Law
teachers are really neither "authentic academics" nor "Hessiantrainers;"20 they have neither full status within academe nor real
standing and independence within the profession. Extensive contact
either with other disciplines or practice is unnecessary.
There is a paradox here. Law is celebrated as being highly functional for the operation of society, but legal theory and legal scholarship are not at all concerned with how that function is really carried
out by lawyers in practice. The paradox is largely unrecognized or
unaddressed, in part because of the divorce of legal academics from
legal practitioners.
Another aspect of the social vision that underlies legal education,
in addition to the autonomy and objectivity of law, is the prevailing
conception of lawyering that regards the bar as hierarchical but unitary. The importance of this unitary conception is evident in the history of professional self-regulation. A crucial episode in the
regulation of the bar was the almost uniformly negative reaction to
Alfred Reed's proposal, for the Carnegie Foundation, that the heterogeneity of the bar be formally recognized in the establishment of a
differentiated bar (pp. 113-17). Despite considerable evidence that
20. These terms are from Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man .Divided Against Himse!f, 54
VA. L. REV. 637, 638 (1968).
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the bar was not unitary (pp. 267-68)21 and despite Reed's suggestion
that the profession's public responsibility could best be served by differential training, licensing, and practice, leaders of the bar and the
academy insisted on maintaining the image that all lawyers were
equal.
But some were more equal than others. In the predominant social vision the model lawyer was and is an idealized image of the
corporate lawyer.22 The model lawyer was the facilitator of commerce and the ally of the dominant institutions of society, the large
concentrations of wealth. He - until recently, always a he - was
relied on for his skill in legal reasoning (the stuff oflegal theory) and
his judgment (his ability to think like a lawyer). While engaged intimately in his client's affairs, he maintained a cool professional detachment from them. Not for the model lawyer were fact-intensive
and emotionally charged areas of practice (criminal law, personal
injury litigation, domestic relations), the intense human contact of
law for the poor, or involvement with political causes.
Because the profession was unitary, and because there was a
model lawyer, those who did not conform to the model a fortiori
should not belong to the profession. Thus, there was a continuing
effort by the bar and the schools to "raise standards"; that is, to exclude from the profession those who could not be expected to emulate the ideal. Training too closely tied to actual practice apprenticeship, night schools, and proprietary schools - became the
institutional target of this effort. The aspirants who relied on these
routes to the bar, often women, blacks, and ethnics, were the ultimate victims.
These visions of law and lawyers mandated the content and
method of teaching in law schools. In all but a few law schools, both
content and method were largely copies of the Harvard style. 23
Since Am.es's conversion of the case method, the model professor has
21. Reed's conclusions about the nature of law practice, the functions of lawyers, and the
role oflaw schools in preparing (or failing to prepare) those practitioners have been confirmed
in two recent studies of the bar in Chicago: J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKINO OF
A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981).
22. The basic source on professional ideology in the twentieth century is J. AUERBACH,
supra note 3. See also Sinion, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29.
23. Harvard's influence was even more far-reaching. As Donna Fossum documents, "[t]he
teachers who constituted the faculties of almost 160 law schools were graduates in disproportionate numbers of a small, select group of law schools. . . • 33.2 percent of all full-time law
teachers received their J.D. degrees from one of a group of only 5 law schools." Harvard
headed the list producing over twice the number of graduates in law teaching as Yale, which
was second on the list. Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile ofthe Teaching Branch ofthe Legal
Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 501, 507. Thus, the Harvardization of American
legal education was accomplished via program imitation and the dominance, numerically, of
Harvard graduates in the teaching ranks.
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taught process more than substance, the process of engaging in the
. single activity from which lawyers laid claim to their professional
position: the analysis of cases and statutes. The unarticulated methodology of "tbinkinp; like a lawyer" rather than the communication
of information or the development of other lawyerly abilities is the
nearly exclusive aim of legal education.24 Varied forms of pedagogy
are little used at all. In the contemporary classroom, Socratic dialogue is interspersed with lecture and discussion, but these are minor
variations considering the full range of pedagogical possibilities.
Huge classes, authoritarian teaching, and final examinations as the
exclusive evaluation device predominate. The learner who is disadvantaged by this peculiar form of instruction falls by the wayside, as
he or she should. The novice lawyer who leaves law school unprepared for almost anything real lawyers do is no longer the law
school's responsibility.
This, then, is the social vision inherent in the history oflegal education presented by Stevens: autonomous but certain (or ascertainable) law, elite but democratic lawyers, and narrow but demanding
training. Trenchant criticism of the way law schools have developed
dictates dramatic reform of the way they operate today. To conclude, we offer a summary of such an alternative - an alternative
based upon an analysis of how law works, of what lawyers do, and of
how law students should be educated.
III.

LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS CURE

In the social vision of traditional legal education, law is determinate and apolitical. In the countervision, law is irrationally indeterminate and contingent upon the social world. This alternative view
suggests attributes of a new model lawyer quite different from the
elite picture in the traditional vision, and those attributes require a
different approach to law school learning.
Stevens notes the effect of the Realist revolution on American
legal thought:
The Realists went a long way toward killing the idea of ''the system"
altogether. All legal logic came under suspicion. American law became increasingly purposive, increasingly secularized, and increasingly
atomized. [P. 156].

What the Realists began, their successors have completed. Both critics of the legal system25 and its defenders (by their failure to meet
24. The dominance of the case method has been so great that Stevens devotes a paragraph
to the Legal Realists' modest innovation of introducing "Cases and Materials on .•." (as
opposed to "Cases on . . .") books. P. 158.
25. E.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975); Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
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the Realist challenge)26 have shown us that law is neither an objective decisionmak.ing process nor capable of being made so. We understand law to be a system of ethical and political discourse and,
like other discourse in ethics and politics, it is a vehicle for argument
and analysis but not for certain decision.
If law is indefinite, it cannot function in the manner imagined by
the traditional vision.27 The variety of social forces influencing the
making of a given body of law or even a particular legal decision
cannot be reduced to simple notions such as "facilitating commerce"
or "punishing wrongdoers," and their interaction cannot be predicted reliably or assessed accurately in particular circumstances.
Conversely, the social impact of a rule or body of law is not subject
to secure calculation.
The new model lawyer can function with neither the detachment
nor the limited skills of the elite corporate lawyer. This new lawyer
needs cognitive, affective, and performance capabilities of an entirely different order. Law demystified places an emphasis upon particular, identifiable lawyer competencies. The first of these
competencies is the ability to "think like a lawyer" in something like
the traditional sense. As Stevens documents, from Langdell onward
that phrase has been embodied with mystical power but has not been
given explicit meaning. Practically nowhere in the legal literature is
there a definition of "thinking like a lawyer." 28 Thinking like a lawyer, in our view, constitutes a limited but definite set of cognitive
skills associated with legal reasoning. These include the acquisition
of a legal vocabulary, the ability to generate broad and narrow holdings of judicial decisions and thereby to argue precedents, an understanding of the nature of legal rule systems and the ability to
manipulate rule systems in particular cases, and an understanding of
the systematic nature of legal argumentation and the ability to make
arguments in the typical patterns of legal discourse.
This process of thinking like a lawyer is primarily concerned with
legal doctrine and legal forms. But the new model lawyer must do
more. No lawyer practices without interacting with other people;
26. A concise introduction is Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 5, at 18, 26-37.
27. See generally Feinman, Critical Approaches lo Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829,
847-57 (1983).
28. So far as we know, the few attempts to give content to the phrase are limited to discussion of case skills. E.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951). Other attempts to define
what skills law schools should teach tend to be too vague to be of programmatic utility. See,
e.g., Summers, The Future of Economics in Legal Education: Limits and Constraints, 33 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 337, 355-58 (1983). Our list of the components of "thinking like a lawyer"
draws heavily on the analysis of legal education by Duncan Kennedy. See, e.g., Kennedy,
Legal Education As Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI·
TIQUE, supra note 5, at 40, 44-46. For a similar enumeration, see Kennedy, 1 Torts Syllabus 3
(Sept. 5, 1980) (on file with authors).

February 1984]

Legal Education

929

lawyering requires a variety of interpersonal skills for collaborative,
consultative, and competitive relations. Nor do legal problems present themselves abstractly; the lawyer must have the ability to deal
with facts, the capacity to discover and analyze both the facts of particular matters presented and the contextual facts that shape the legal
decisions to be made. Finally, the lawyer must be able to execute the
decisions that are made on the basis of law, fact, and interpersonal
contact. This involves the ability to exploit the appropriate legal
forms and procedures as well as the ability to implement nonlegal
strategies in furtherance of client goals.
The malleability and caprice of legal doctrine and legal process
constantly place the lawyer in a position of uncertainty. Throughout
a legal career, a lawyer is faced with new or changed situations for
which he or she could not have been adequately prepared by education or prior experience. One of the key attributes of the new model
lawyer is a high tolerance for this uncertainty. But tolerance is not
acceptance. In a number of ways the lawyer can begin to master
uncertainty. One is through a perspective on the larger legal environment, a perspective that places an uncertain situation in a
broader context. The lawyer also reduces uncertainty by making an
unfamiliar situation more familiar. Lawyers must be competent at
learning autonomously and learning with others. It is in this way
that practitioners can constantly reeducate themselves. Autonomous
learning, in tum, is furthered by and requires critical self-reflectiveness. It is critical self-reflectiveness that permits a lawyer to know of
his or her need for further learning, it is critical self-reflectiveness
that provides the means of judging one's own performance as a legal
practitioner (rather than simply adopting prevailing standards), and
it is through critical self-reflectiveness that one evaluates the operation of law in society more generally.
In addition to thinking like a lawyer, the other performance competencies, and the processes of coping with uncertainty, there is at
least one additional, essential requirement of the model professional:
judgment. The lawyer must apply legal ideas to factual problems,
must deliberate by positing alternatives, considering options, and rehearsing consequences, must implement the choice, and must then
accept responsibility for the choice made. In sum, the lawyer's basic
duty is to perform in the absence of certainty.
In the countervision, the role of law school is to prepare the student to be a model lawyer, to assist the student in acquiring and
practicing the capabilities discussed above. In the new law school,
these essential lawyer competencies are the basis for planning the ·
educational program. Of necessity then, the crucial element in the
new law school is a concern for the education of students. In the
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traditional law school vision, the focus is on teaching, not learning.29
For reasons economic, social, and historical - but not educational
- the dominant style of teaching, the case method, is centered on
the professor rather than the students. In the new law school, learning objectives are achieved by a variety of student-centered approaches and environments such as structured individual and group
learning, team teaching, formative evaluation, and mastery learning,
that address the individual needs of the individual learner.30
Students in the new law school are provided explicit delineation
of the competencies to be learned and the processes by which they
will be taught. And in the new law school, the only acceptable level
of student performance is the mastery of the knowledge and skills
required of the novice lawyer. Unlike the traditional law school, in
which student performance is widely distributed and mediocrity is
accepted as inevitable, the new law school is premised on the conviction that nearly all students can perform at a high level if provided
with the proper instructional environment.31 Given the law schools'
informal but important position as gatekeeper for the legal profession, no lower standard is tolerable.
Learning in the new law school must include active learning the opportunity for students to perform in role. 32 Law school must
prefigure the dilemmas and opportunities of law practice in an educational setting that minimizes the potential harm to students and
clients. This is, of course, clinical education, but not merely the performance of lawyerly tasks under occasional supervision, as is the
norm in many clinical programs. Role performance here inculcates
the critical self-reflectiveness to be exercised in law practice. Role
performance in the law school of the countervision implies a relationship between legal scholarship and legal and educational practice very different from that which is currently prevalent. It assumes,
in law as elsewhere, that the immediate and the remote, the concrete
and the general, are intertwined and can only be understood together through the interpretation of experience.
Thus, the cure for legal education. Stevens offers an account
which testifies to the schizophrenia of law schools, comfortable
29. Thus, Stevens' failure to refer to any advance in educational theory or practice outside
the law schools is a wholly appropriate reflection of the view co=only held by law teachers
that professors of education or educational psychology are either primitives or charlatans. The
different approach of the countervision of legal education requires openness to educational
theory. An example of educational theory that is both provocative and especially useful is
found in B. BLOOM, HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS AND SCHOOL LEARNING (1976).
30. Readers interested in one application of such methods are invited to contact us for
information about our experience in teaching Contorts.
31. See MASTERY LEARNING: THEORY AND PRACTICE (J. Block ed. 1971); B. BLOOM,
supra note 29.
32. See Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (1973).
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neither in the academy or the profession. We propose an alternative
in which law schools merge theory and practice and, in the process,
present the opportunity for reconstructing both.

